I read a blog post somewhere that suggested TowelRoot does not need internet access, and I've also read that it does. The latest version I tried to run TowelRoot v3 will not work without it. Is it downloading or sending any information? If so, what?
Addendum: I suppose if they were trying to accomplish anything nefarious, they would just do it instead of asking for permission... right?
Since TowelRoot's code is not publicly available, I resorted to decompile the latest APK, downloaded from the TowelRoot website, in order to investigate the app's need for the INTERNET permission.
Upon successful decompilation, it turned out that neither the activities nor the code itself be obfuscated. The developer certainly had anticipated that this app would've been investigated, yet he had left the code to be as much transparent as possible.
The most important file we have at this point is TowelRoot.smali, which describes all the workings of this app.
Note: depending on your particular version of ApkTool, the line numbers may vary.
In lines 13-22, the code initializes a field called fingerprint. The relevant code follows:
.field fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
.annotation system Ldalvik/annotation/Signature;
value = {
"Ljava/util/List",
"<",
"Lorg/apache/http/NameValuePair;",
">;"
}
.end annotation
.end field
which is a Java list composed of key-value pairs, to be used when collecting the relevant info from the phone.
In lines 56-215, the code describes a method called fillInFingerprint, which is responsible for retrieving the appropriate data to be sent to the TowelRoot website, in order to ascertain whether the device can be rooted via the homonymous exploit. This method makes an extensive use of the abovementioned fingerprint field. The collected data follows.
The visible device model. Lines 70-80:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "model"
sget-object v7, Landroid/os/Build;->MODEL:Ljava/lang/String;
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
An unique identifier for the OS build. Lines 83-93:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "fingerprint"
sget-object v7, Landroid/os/Build;->FINGERPRINT:Ljava/lang/String;
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
Likely the processor board. Lines 96-106:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "hardware"
sget-object v7, Landroid/os/Build;->HARDWARE:Ljava/lang/String;
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
Device's unique serial number. Lines 109-119:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "serial"
sget-object v7, Landroid/os/Build;->SERIAL:Ljava/lang/String;
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
Vital since the exploit is likely to have been patched in the recent kernels. Lines 122-134:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "kernel"
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->javaSucksAssReadTheKernelVersion()Ljava/lang/String;
move-result-object v7
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
Lines 168-180:
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "appversion"
invoke-direct {p0}, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->getSoftwareVersion()Ljava/lang/String;
move-result-object v7
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v7}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
The string modstring. Lines 202-211:
.local v1, "modstring":Ljava/lang/String;
iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;
const-string v6, "modstring"
invoke-direct {v5, v6, v1}, Lorg/apache/http/message/BasicNameValuePair;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
invoke-interface {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/List;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
In lines 227-329 the code describes the method queryServer, which queries the server's database in order to find a match with the collected data, and handles the possible exceptions in the code. Such data is transmitted to the URL https://towelroot.appspot.com/report/ via SSL and a POST request (lines 263-275):
.local v2, "httppost":Lorg/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPost;
new-instance v5, Lorg/apache/http/client/entity/UrlEncodedFormEntity;
iget-object v6, p0, Lcom/geohot/towelroot/TowelRoot;->fingerprint:Ljava/util/List;
invoke-direct {v5, v6}, Lorg/apache/http/client/entity/UrlEncodedFormEntity;-><init>(Ljava/util/List;)V
invoke-virtual {v2, v5}, Lorg/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPost;->setEntity(Lorg/apache/http/HttpEntity;)V
.line 88
invoke-interface {v1, v2}, Lorg/apache/http/client/HttpClient;->execute(Lorg/apache/http/client/methods/HttpUriRequest;)Lorg/apache/http/HttpResponse;
move-result-object v3
The method buttonClicked (lines 333-426) contains the code that makes the app work when you push the button. Amongst others, it calls the methods fillInFingerprint to gather the required info, and queryServer to see if the device can be rooted.
It then proceeds by analyzing the server's response. If said response is empty, TowelRoot prompts you about the necessity of an Internet connection (lines 369-378):
invoke-virtual {v0, v2}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
move-result v2
if-eqz v2, :cond_1
.line 115
const-string v2, "Please ensure you are connected to the internet"
invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Landroid/widget/TextView;->setText(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)V
If the response is not empty, then TowelRoot proceeds by checking if the abovementioned equals the string nyet (lines 391-402):
const-string v2, "nyet"
invoke-virtual {v0, v2}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
move-result v2
if-eqz v2, :cond_2
.line 117
const-string v2, "This phone isn\'t currently supported"
invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Landroid/widget/TextView;->setText(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)V
If the response equals nyet, then the phone isn't officially supported.
Finally, if the response is both non-empty and different from nyet, TowelRoot starts the rooting procedure by calling the native method rootTheShit, defined at line 448 and probably contained inside the library libexploit.so.
TowelRoot includes a special mode for users with unsupported devices. This mode, whose code is defined inside the method titleClicked (lines 451-504), is accessible by tapping the red welcome to towelroot v3 title inside the app, and will allow the user to try different modstrings in order to try to root the device anyway.
